On Optimims, Part I

The clouds are building up. I think it might rain today. We could use some rain: the summer’s been dry. I don’t feel so out of whack but I still feel sluggish — like an anemic rhinoceros. Last night I went back to the bluffs. I played my own little version of hopscotch — the rule is you can only step on rocks unless there aren’t any. My grandmother was there. She’s nearing her mid-seventies. She trooped through those trees, climbed on those rocks, and waded through that water in good shape.

Today I thought about optimism and its impact on the human condition. So I conjured a thought-experiment and began to Socratically question all the clouds of perception surrounding the word ‘optimism’. For instance,

1. What virtues and mechanisms foster optimism?
2. In what situations is optimism appropriate?
3. Does optimism outweigh pessimism?
4. On what scales do we measure optimism and pessimism?

People tend to define optimism as a virtue itself but I would rather define it as an objective phenomena. Therefore the question is not what virtues foster optimism but what virtues does optimism foster? Let us think of an optimistic person — Susie — who people consider optimistic because she always looks on the sunny side of things and she is always grateful for the things she possesses — or in other words she is humble. Now let us think of another optimistic person — Meagan — who always looks on the sunny side of things but is always excited about her potential to take advantage of Susie. Both of these persons are optimists. Both are optimistic in an egocentric manner — Susie with her possessions and Meagan with her conniving ability. Both, however, differ in their rationale for optimism — Susie is a fatalist whereas Meagan is a voluntarist. Also by recognizing that there is an egocentric dimension we also recognize there is a non-egocentric dimension of optimism: an other-centric dimension.

Hence we’ve discovered four types of optimism: fatalistic egocentric optimism (I), fatalistic other-centered optimism (II), voluntaristic other-centered optimism (III), and voluntaristic egocentric optimism (IV). We could classify certain behaviors and even certain persons as Type I, II, III, or IV. Those with delusions of grandeur could be Type Is whereas persons like Robespierre are Type IIs. Therefore the question arises, under which conditions do certain types become appropriate? And from whose perspective?

In an ‘appropriate’ situation the phenomena of fatalistic optimism would correlate to a situation of historical necessity — that is, in situations in which the forces outside one’s control or a group’s control override or determine the subjective activity of individuals. So in a case of historical necessity the question arises from which perspective can we deem an attitude as appropriately egocentric or other-centric? Here Sartre’s notions of seriality and totality bear weight on our judgments. A serial group — the bourgeois for instance — have permanent interests in egocentric pursuits and only under certain conditions, short or long, do they begin to take on the process of totalization: of other-centering one’s alignment.

We’ve determined that in cases of historical necessity it is the issue of seriality and totality of a social group that determines the centering of the type of optimism expressed. So what defines the centering in questions of free and conscious, or ‘ethical’, activity? A serial group would likewise act in a way that would benefit the ‘I’ the most whereas a totalized group would desire collective benefits. However, ethical life is more complex as it is subject to the varying degrees of consciousness and will of individuals. Hence a person must come ‘in line’ as it where with the appropriate ethical behavior, more so in totalized groups. Here self-criticism and criticism become a prime factor in the advancement of a certain social group.

Here a question pops up: do social groups come ingrained with the mechanisms of self-criticism and criticism or do they construct them? I think a page one of our history textbooks would clearly judge in favor of the construction hypothesis. Therefore one of the primary ethical activities of a social group is the questioning of all ethical activities.